

Opening Electronic safe locks with Ketchup & Lasers

9th of February Hackerhotel 2024 Jan-Willem Markus







Whois Jan-Willem Markus



- Work:
 - Electronics engineering
 - Security analyst & trainer at Riscure
 - Advanced hardware attacks
- Locksport:
 - President of The Open Organisation Of Lockpickers (Toool)
 - Lockpicking workshops
 - Sharing knowledge on Toool Blackbag
 - Research: Whatever has my interest
- Contact
 - Jan-Willem@Toool.nl
 - @jwrm22

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Electronic safe locks

Introduction



7

Electronic safe locks

- Electronic safe locks are interesting:
 - Small attack surface
 - Standalone
 - Good basis for security
 - Hardware attacks
 - Quite affordable (usually)





• Force multiplication

Safe

Door

Secure by design

POWERD
GNDD
KEYPAD ¢
KEYPAD_BUZZER
KEYPAD_LED C

POWER	
DGND	
♦ KEYPAD	
CKEYPAD_BUZZER	
CKEYPAD_LED	





- Consumer / commercial
 - Requirements:
 - UL 2058 Type 1
 - Easy to use
 - Reliable locks for a good price





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- Banking and Pharmacy
 - Requirements:
 - Multi user
 - Auditing
 - Delays
 - 2FA



- Government special
 - Requirements:
 - FF-L-2740 B
 - EMP proof
 - TEMPEST proof
 - Etc
 - Kaba Mas X0 series
 - X07: 1992
 - X08: 1998
 - X09: 2002
 - X10: 2013







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Novel work on the X0 locks




Access to samples



Samples from the USA

- eBay bulk
- Trade with fellow lockpickers
- Shipping cost is bottleneck





Hardware Reverse engineering





Hardware Reverse Engineering (HWRE)


- Taking the lock a part
- Determining the function of each part
- Create a schematic
- Focused on all the X0* at the same time \rightarrow Slow progress




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




8051



- Xgcu TI866II Programmer with Xgpro
 - Changed to Minipro (CLI)
- Locked & fused & encrypted
- Acquired open samples
 - Ebay, not cheap
 - Pre-programmed ⊗




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
Chip reverse engineering



- Decap many chips
 - Heat & twist
- Photographing
 - Metallurgical microscope
 - Stitching 208MP
- Ideas for the future
 - Micro probing
 - Visiting friends with a SEM
 - International collaboration








Fault injection




- (Non) invasive Hardware attack
 - Relatively straightforward process
 - Basic setup for $< \in 1000$
 - Difficult to do right
- Methods
 - Voltage
 - Timing
 - Clock
 - Electromagnetic
 - Lasers





Fault injection





- Sample preparation for Laser FI
 - Chip side
 - Dangergous chemicals
 - Back side
 - Easy mechanical process

















Laser = Success




- X07
 - Copyright 1990,91,92 Dan L. Thompson Mas-Hamilton Group
- X08
 - Copyright 1999 Mas-Hamilton Group
- X09
 - Copyright 2002 Kaba-Mas Dan Thompson

Fault injection



- PicoEMP
 - Colin O'Flynn (NewEA)
 - Opensource
 - € 100 in parts
 - Slightly underpowered
- Human XYZ
 - Pantograph




Try a more 'Abrasive' method






🧓 @Jan-Willem @abrasive Congrats on the work. I'd like to compare notes some time about the X0 memory dump. I've done something similar, but it was serious effort involving lasers...








'Abrasive' method



• 8051dumper

- Mark J. Blair
- https://gitlab.com/NF6X_Retrocomputing/8051dumper



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Ketchup

Previous work



Inspiration



July 5, 2019

NKT 07/05/2019 2:12 PM https://youtu.be/aWToH50

YouTube

TURBODECODER LOCKSMITH PICK TOOLS FACTORY

Electronic safe locks opening demo with E Lock Shock kit !!




July 6, 2019



Jan-Willem Toool NL 07/06/2019 10:03 AM
@NKT

As an electrical engineer I'm quite confused. The liquid shorts something, still it opens the lock.



On our web site www.turbodecoder.com you can see the full list and specification of tested and opened locks. ...more

Turbodecoder




- Lock genius & Creators of advanced lock opening tools
 - E-LOCK SHOCK kit
 - €600. (refills at €50 a lock)
 - https://turbodecoder.com/product/e-lock-shock/



Ketchup opens locks




- Hypothesis:
 - The motor and power contacts are very close together.
 - The liquid is quite high resistance. (100 ohm/cm).
- Nigel added:
 - It seems no-one knows why it works, it just does.
 - Most people use ketchup, which is thick enough not to run away, and conductive enough to work.
- To do:
 - Pick up a bottle of ketchup and measure the conductivity.
 - Get an electronic lock and measure how it's wired.



Reverse engineering

- Circuit board:
 - The microcontroller is a ST62T62C6
 - (OTP, Cheap, obsolete)
 - linear regulator 3.3V
 - 2222N NPN
 - ZT751 PNP
- Solonoid
 - N001 DET 0503A 10E04
 - Measurements:
 - Active: 5.3V, 0.2A
 - R = U/I = 26.5Ω
 - Non polarized








Transistor circuit





- Transistors = amplifiers
- Small current transistor -> High amplification (>100)
- Large current transistor -> Small amplification (<100)





















Simulation results

- Measurement:
 - Resistor I1
 - 5000 0.322
 - 10000 0.321
 - 15000 0.318
 - 20000 0.236
 - 25000 0.167
 - 30000
 0.128
 - 35000 0.107
 - 40000 0.093
 - 40000 0:000
 - 45000 0.082
 - 50000 0.072






Exhaustive testing



- Exhaustive testing
 - TDS & EC meter
 - Siemens = 1/R
 - Tested dozens of liquids



Exhaustive testing


- Close enough:
 - Coctail sause
 - Ketchup
 - Curry
 - Garlic sause
 - Shower gel





Demo: Opening a safe lock with Ketchup






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Wrapping up







Devo over at Lockpickers United

Other's work



- Plore
 - Side-channel attacks on high-security electronic safe locks
 - DEF CON 24
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXFpCV646E0
- Michael Huebler
 - The KABA MAS X-09 High Security Safe Lock
 - Oktober 2008
 - <u>https://toool.nl/Publications</u>
- Mike Davis
 - No Mas
 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=viU8Qs1Sccg
 - DEF CON 27
- Lance H. Mayhew Jr.
 - Electronic Safe Locks And How To Defeat Them
 - 2019

